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Abstract
The common perception in both academic literature and
the industry today is that virtual machines offer better se-
curity, while containers offer better performance. How-
ever, a detailed review of the history of these technolo-
gies and the current threats they face reveals a different
story. This survey covers key developments in the evo-
lution of virtual machines and containers from the 1950s
to today, with an emphasis on countering modern misper-
ceptions with accurate historical details and providing a
solid foundation for ongoing research into the future of
secure isolation for multitenant infrastructures, such as
cloud and container deployments.
1 Introduction
Many modern computing workloads run in multitenant
environments, such as cloud or containers, where each
physical machine is split into hundreds or thousands of
smaller units of computing, called virtual machines, con-
tainers, cloud instances, or more generically guests. Typ-
ically, a single tenant (a user or group of users) is granted
access to deploy guests in an orchestrated fashion across
a cloud or cluster made up of hundreds or thousands
of physical machines located in the same data center or
across multiple data centers, to facilitate operational flex-
ibility in areas such as capacity planning, resiliency, and
reliable performance under variable load. Each guest
runs its own (often minimal) operating system and ap-
plication workloads, and maintains the illusion of being
a physical machine, both to the end users who interact
with the services running in the guests, and to develop-
ers who are able to build those services using familiar
abstractions, such as programming languages, libraries,
and operating system features. The illusion, however, is
not perfect, because ultimately the guests do share the
hardware resources (CPU, memory, cache, devices) of
the underlying physical host machine, and consequently
also have greater access to the host’s privileged software
(kernel, operating system) than a physically distinct ma-
chine would have.
Ideally, multitenant environments would offer strong
isolation of the guest from the host, and between guests
on the same host, but reality falls short of the ideal. The
approaches that various implementations have taken to
isolating guests have different strengths and weaknesses.
For example, containers share a kernel with the host,
while virtual machines may run as a process in the host
operating system or a module in the host kernel, so they
expose different attack surfaces through different code
paths in the host operating system. Fundamentally, how-
ever, all existing implementations of virtual machines
and containers are leaky abstractions, exposing more of
the underlying software and hardware than is necessary,
useful, or desirable. New security research in 2018 deliv-
ered a further blow to the ideal of isolation in multitenant
environments, demonstrating that certain hardware vul-
nerabilities related to speculative execution—including
Spectre, Meltdown, Foreshadow, L1TF, and variants—
can easily bypass the software isolation of guests.
Because multitenancy has proven to be useful and
profitable for a large sector of the computing industry,
it is likely that a significant percentage of computing
workloads will continue to run in multitenant environ-
ments for the foreseeable future. This is not a matter
of naı¨vete´, but of pragmatism: these days, the compa-
nies who provide and make use of multitenant environ-
ments are generally fully aware of the security risks, but
they do so anyway because the benefits—such as flexi-
bility, resiliency, reliability, performance, cost, or any of
a dozen other factors—outweigh the risks for their par-
ticular use cases and business needs. That being the case,
it is worthwhile to take a step back and examine how the
past sixty years of evolution led to the current tension be-
tween secure ideals and flawed reality, and what lessons
from the past might help us build more secure software
and hardware for the next sixty years.
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Figure 1: The evolution of virtual machines and containers.
This survey is divided into sections following the evo-
lutionary paths of the technologies behind virtual ma-
chines and containers, generally in chronological order,
as illustrated in Figure 1. Section 3 explores the com-
mon origins of virtual machines and containers in the
late 1950s and early 1960s, driven by the architectural
shift toward multitasking and multiprocessing, and moti-
vated by a desire to securely isolate processes, efficiently
utilize shared resources, improve portability, and mini-
mize complexity. Section 4 examines the first virtual ma-
chines in the mid-1960s to 1970s, which primarily aimed
to improve resource utilization in time-sharing systems.
Section 5 delves into the capability systems of the early
1960s to 1970s—the precursors of modern containers—
which evolved along a parallel track to virtual machines,
with similar motivations but different implementations.
Section 6 outlines the resurgence of virtual machines in
the late 1990s and 2000s. Section 7 traces the emergence
of containers in the 2000s and 2010s. Section 8 investi-
gates the impact of recent security research on both vir-
tual machines and containers. Section 9 briefly looks at
the relationship between virtual machines and containers
and the related terms “cloud”, “serverless”, and “uniker-
nels”.
2 Terminology
For the sake of clarity, this survey consistently uses cer-
tain modern or common terms, even when discussing lit-
erature that used various other terms for the same con-
cepts.
• container: The term “container” does not have a
single origin, but some early relevant examples of
use are Banga et al. [25] in 1999, Lottiaux and
Morin [125] in 2001, Morin et al. [143] in 2002,
and Price and Tucker [162] in 2004. Early litera-
ture on containers confusingly referred to them as a
kind of virtualization [162; 180; 140; 102; 45; 48],
or even called them virtual machines [180]. As con-
tainers grew more popular, the confusion shifted to
virtual machines being called containers [37; 217].
This survey uses the term “container” for mul-
titenant deployment techniques involving process
isolation on a shared kernel (in contrast with virtual
machine, as defined below). However, in practice
the distinction between containers and virtual ma-
chines is more of a spectrum than a binary divide.
Techniques common to one can be effectively ap-
plied to the other, such as using system call filter-
ing with containers, or using seccomp sandboxing
or user namespaces with virtual machines.
• complexity: There are many dimensions to com-
plexity in computing, but in the context of mul-
titenant infrastructures some uniquely relevant di-
mensions are keeping each guest, the interactions
between guests, and the host’s management of the
guests as small and simple as possible. The im-
plementation technique of isolation supports mini-
mizing complexity by restricting access to internal
knowledge of the guests and host, and providing
well-defined interfaces to reduce the complexity of
interactions between them.
• guest: The term “guest” had some early usage in
the 1980s for the operating system image running
inside a virtual machine [145], but was not com-
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mon until the early 2000s [194; 26]. This survey
uses “guest” as a general term for operating sys-
tem images hosted on multitenant infrastructures,
but occasionally distinguishes between virtual ma-
chine guests and container guests.
• kernel: A variety of different terms appear in the
early literature, including “supervisory program”
[52], “supervisor program” [20], “control program”
[147; 151; 15], “coordinating program” [151], “nu-
cleus” [43; 1], “monitor” [206], and ultimately “ker-
nel” around the mid-1970s [121; 159]. This survey
uses the modern term “kernel”.
• performance: There are many dimensions to per-
formance in computing, but in the context of mul-
titenant infrastructures some uniquely relevant di-
mensions are the performance impact of added lay-
ers of abstraction separating the guest application
workload from the host, balanced against the perfor-
mance benefits of sharing resources between guests
and reducing wasted resources from unused capac-
ity. At the level of a single machine, this involves
running multiple guests on the same machine at
the same time, with potential for intelligent, dy-
namic scheduling to extract more work from the
same resource pool. Across multiple machines this
involves a larger pool of shared resources, more
flexibility to balance work, and options for hetroge-
nous hardware with resource-affinity configurations
(e.g. a mixture of some CPU-heavy machines and
some storage-heavy machines, with workload al-
location determined by resource needs). The im-
plementation technique of breaking down machines
into smaller guests and their resources into smaller,
sharable units, supports performance by allowing
finer-grained and distributed control over resource
management.
• portability: There are many dimensions to porta-
bility in computing, but in the context of multi-
tenant infrastructures some uniquely relevant di-
mensions are developing guests in a standardized
way—without any special knowledge of the en-
vironment where they will be deployed—and ab-
stracting deployment and management across phys-
ical machines, limiting dependence on low-level
hardware details. For example, a container guest
can be deployed anywhere in the cluster, or a vir-
tual machine guest can be deployed on any compute
machine in the cloud. The implementation tech-
niques of standardizing interfaces so guests are sub-
stitutable and hiding implementation and hardware
details behind well-defined interfaces both support
portability.
• process: The early literature tended to use the terms
“job” [169] or “program” [52; 151; 20], and “pro-
cess” only appeared around the mid-1960s [64; 14].
This survey uses the modern term “process”. The
early use of “multiprogramming” meaning “multi-
processing” was derived from the early use of “pro-
gram” meaning “process”.
• security: There are many dimensions to security
in computing, but in the context of multitenant in-
frastructures some uniquely relevant dimensions are
limiting access between guests, from guests to the
host, and from the host to the guests. The imple-
mentation technique of isolation supports security,
at both the software level and the hardware level, by
reducing the likelihood of a breach and limiting the
scope of damage when a breach occurs.
• virtual machine: This survey uses the term “virtual
machine” for multitenant deployment techniques
involving the replication/emulation of real hard-
ware architectures in software (in contrast with con-
tainer, as defined above). The code responsible for
managing virtual machine guests on a physical host
machine is often called a “hypervisor” or “virtual
machine monitor”, both derived from early terms
for the kernel, “supervisor” and “monitor”. In many
early implementations of virtual machines, the host
kernel managed both guests and ordinary processes.
3 Common origins
The origins of both virtual machines and containers can
be traced to a fundamental shift in hardware and soft-
ware architectures toward the late 1950s. The hardware
of the time introduced the concept of multiprogramming,
which included both basic multitasking in the form of
simple context-switching and basic multiprocessing in
the form of dedicated I/O processors and multiple CPUs.
Codd [51] attributed the earliest known use of the term
multiprogramming to Rochester [169] in 1955, describ-
ing the ability of an IBM 705 system to interrupt an
I/O process (tape read), run a process (calculation) on
the data found, and then return to the I/O process. The
concept of multiprogramming evolved over the remain-
der of the decade through work on the EDSAC [208],
UNIVAC LARC [69], STRETCH (IBM 7030) [68; 52],
TX-2 [76], and an influential and comprehensive re-
view by Gill [81]. Key trade-offs discussed in the lit-
erature on multiprogramming—around security, perfor-
mance, portability, and complexity—continue to echo
through modern literature on virtual machines and con-
tainers.
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3.1 Security
Multiprogramming increased the complexity of the sys-
tem software—due to simultaneous and interleaved pro-
cesses interacting with other processes and shared hard-
ware resources—and also increased the consequences
of misbehaving system software—since any process had
the potential to disrupt any other process on the same
machine. Codd et al. [52] discussed secure isola-
tion as a requirement for “noninterference” between pro-
cesses regarding errors, in the core design principles for
STRETCH. Codd [51] later expanded on the requirement
as a need to prevent processes from making “accidental
or fraudulent” changes to another process. Buzen and
Gagliardi [43] called out the risk of one process modi-
fying memory allocated to other processes or privileged
system operations.
In response to the increase in complexity and risk, sys-
tem software of the time introduced a familiar form of
isolation, granting a small privileged kernel of system
software unrestricted access to all hardware resources
and running processes, as well as responsibility for po-
tentially disruptive operations such as memory and stor-
age allocation, process scheduling, and interrupt han-
dling, while restricting access to such features from any
software outside the kernel. Codd et al. [52] described
the structure and function of the STRETCH kernel in de-
tail, including concurrency, interrupts, memory protec-
tion, and time limits (an early form of resource usage
control). Amdahl et al. [20] touched on the separation
of the kernel in the IBM System/360, including appen-
dices of relevant opcodes and protected storage locations.
Opler and Baird [151] weighed trade-offs around having
the kernel take responsibility for coordinating the parallel
operation of processes, and judged the approach to have
potential to improve portability of programs not written
for parallel operation, as well as potential to minimize
complexity for programmers who would no longer be re-
sponsible to manually coordinate the parallel operation
of each program.
3.2 Performance
One of the fundamental goals of adding multiprogram-
ming to hardware and operating systems in the late 1950s
was to improve performance through more efficient uti-
lization of available resources by sharing them across
parallel processes. Codd et al. [52] described perfor-
mance as a requirement for “noninterference” between
processes regarding “undue delay”. Opler and Baird
[151] explored the trade-offs between the performance
advantages of increasing utilization through multipro-
cessing, versus the increased complexity of developing
for such systems. Codd published two further papers in
1960 [49; 50] about performance considerations for pro-
cess scheduling algorithms in multiprogramming. Am-
dahl et al. [20, p. 89] explored the trade-offs between
performance and portability in the architecture design of
the IBM System/360. Dennis [63, p. 590] noted the per-
formance advantages of dynamic memory allocation for
multiprogramming.
3.3 Portability
In the 1950s, it was common for specialized system
software to be developed for each new model of hard-
ware, requiring programs to be rewritten to run on even
closely-related machines. As the system software and
programs grew larger and more complex, the porting ef-
fort grew more costly, motivating a desire for programs
to be portable across different machines. Codd et al.
[52] discussed portability as a requirement for “indepen-
dence of preparation” and “flexible allocation of space
and time”. Amdahl et al. [20, p. 97] emphasized porta-
bility as one of the primary design goals of the IBM Sys-
tem/360, specifically allowing machine-language pro-
grams to run unmodified across six different hardware
models, with a variety of different configurations of pe-
ripheral devices. Buzen and Gagliardi [43] noted that
the introduction of a privileged kernel compounded the
problem of portability, since a program might have to be
rewritten to run on two different kernels, even when the
underlying hardware was compatible or completely iden-
tical.
3.4 Minimizing complexity
Another early realization after the introduction of mul-
tiprogramming was that it was unreasonable to expect
the developer of each process to directly manage all the
complexity of interacting with every other process run-
ning on the machine, so the privileged kernel approach
had the advantage of allowing processes to maintain a
more minimal focus on their own internals. Codd et al.
[52] described minimizing complexity as a requirement
for “minimum information from programmer”. Nearly
a decade before Rushby first wrote about the idea of
a Trusted Computing Base [171], Buzen and Gagliardi
[43, p.291] argued for minimizing complexity within the
privileged kernel, noting that such separation was effec-
tive when the privileged code base was kept small, so it
could be maintained in a relatively stable state, with lim-
ited changes over time, by a few expert developers.
4 Early virtual machines
The early work on virtual machines grew directly out of
the work on multiprogramming, continuing the goal of
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safely sharing the resources of a physical machine across
multiple processes. Initially, the idea was no more than a
refinement on memory protection between processes, but
it expanded into a much bigger idea: that small isolated
bundles of shared resources from the host machine could
present the illusion of being a physical machine running
a full operating system.
4.1 M44/44X
In 1964, Nelson [147] published an internal research re-
port at IBM outlining plans for an experimental machine
based on the IBM 7044, called the M44. The project built
on earlier work in multiprogramming, improving process
isolation and scheduling in the privileged kernel with an
early form of virtual memory. They called the memory
mapped for a particular process a “virtual machine” [147,
p. 14]. The 44X part of the name stood for the virtual ma-
chines (also based on the IBM 7044) running on top of
the M44 host machine.
Nelson [147, p. 4-6] identified the performance ad-
vantages of dynamically allocated shared resources (es-
pecially memory and CPU) as one of the primary mo-
tivators for the M44/44X experiments. Portability was
another central consideration, allowing software to run
unmodified across single process, multiprocess, and de-
bugging contexts [147, pp. 9-10].
The M44/44X lacked almost all of the features we
would associate with virtual machines today, but it
played an important, though largely forgotten, part in the
history of virtual machines. Denning [62] reflected that
the M44/44X was central to significant theoretical and
experimental advances in memory research around pag-
ing, segmentation, and virtual memory in the 1960s.
4.2 Cambridge Monitor System
The IBM System/360 was explicitly designed for porta-
bility of software across different models and different
hardware configurations [20]. In the mid-1960s, IBM’s
Control Program-40 Cambridge Monitor System (CP-
40/CMS) project running on a modified IBM System/360
(model 40) took the idea a few steps further—initially
calling the work a “pseudo-machine”, but later adopting
the term “virtual machine” [60, p. 485]. The CP-40/CMS
and later CP-67/CMS1 projects improved on earlier ap-
proaches to portability, making it possible for software
written for a bare metal machine to run unmodified in
a virtual machine, which could simulate the appearance
of various different hardware configurations [15, pp. 1-
2]. It also improved isolation by introducing privilege
separation for interrupts [15, pp. 6-7], paged memory
within virtual machine guests [43; 153], and simulated
1For the IBM System/360 model 67.
devices [43; 1]. IBM’s work on the CP-40/CMS focused
on improving performance through efficient utilization
of shared memory [15, pp. 3-5], and explictly did not
target efficient utilization of CPU through sharing [15,
p. 1]. Kogut [110] developed a variant of CP-67/CMS
to improve performance through dynamic allocation of
storage (physical disk) to virtual machines.
4.3 VM/370
IBM’s VM/370 running on the System/370 hardware fol-
lowed in the early 1970s, and included virtual memory
hardware [60, p. 485]. Madnick and Donovan [128,
p. 214] estimated the overhead of the VM/370 at 10-15%,
but deemed the performance trade-off to be worthwhile
from a security perspective. Goldberg [84, pp. 39-40]
identified the source of overhead as primarily: maintain-
ing state for virtual processors, trapping and emulating
privileged instructions, and memory address translation
for virtual machine guests (especially when paging was
supported in the guests). In retrospect, Creasy noted that
efficient execution was never a primary goal of IBM’s
work on the CP-40, CP-67, or VM/370 [60, p. 487], and
the focus was instead on efficient utilization of available
resources [60, p. 484].
4.4 Trade-offs
In their formal requirements for virtual machines in the
mid-1970s, Popek and Goldberg [160, p. 413] stated that
ideally virtual machines should “show at worst only mi-
nor decreases in speed” compared to running on bare
metal. In 2017, Bugnion et al. [41] explained Popek
and Goldberg’s requirements in modern terms, exploring
the performance impact for hardware architectures that
do not fully meet the requirements.
Buzen and Gagliardi [43, p. 291], Madnick and
Donovan [128, p. 212], Goldberg [83, p. 75], and
Creasy [60, p. 486] all observed that the portability of-
fered by virtual machines was also an advantage for
development purposes, since it allowed development
and testing of multiple different versions of the ker-
nel/operating systems—and programs targeting those
kernels/operating systems—in multiple different virtual
hardware configurations, on the same physical machine
at the same time.
Buzen and Gagliardi [43] considered one of the key
advantages of the virtual machine approach to be that
“virtual machine monitors typically do not require a large
amount of code or a high degree of logical complex-
ity”. Popek and Kline [159, p. 294] discussed the advan-
tage of virtual machines being smaller and less complex
than a kernel and complete operating system, improving
their potential to be secure. Goldberg [84, p. 39] sug-
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gested minimizing complexity as a way to improve per-
formance: selectively disabling more expensive features
(such as memory paging in guests) for virtual machines
that would not use the features. Creasy [60, p. 488] dis-
cussed the advantages of minimizing interdependencies
between virtual machines, giving preference to standard
interfaces on the host machine.
A frequently-cited group of papers in the early 1970s,
by Lauer and Snow [116], Lauer and Wyeth [117], and
Srodawa and Bates [183], suggested that virtual ma-
chines offered a sufficient level of isolation that it was no
longer necessary to maintain a privilege-separated kernel
in the host operating system. However, by that point in
time the concept of a privileged kernel was well enough
established that the idea of eliminating it bordered on
heresy. Buzen and Gagliardi [43, p. 297] observed that
the proposal depended heavily on the ability of the vir-
tual machine implementation to handle all virtual mem-
ory mapping directly, but since the papers failed to take
memory segmentation into account, the approach could
not be implemented as initially proposed.
4.5 Decline
As companies like DEC, Honeywell, HP, Intel, and Xe-
rox introduced smaller hardware to the market in the
1970s, they did not include hardware support for features
such as virtual memory and the ability to trap all sensitive
instructions, which made it challenging to implement
strong isolation using virtual machine techniques on such
hardware [65; 77]. Creasy [60, p. 484] observed in the
early 1980s that the advent of the personal computer de-
creased interest in the early forms of virtual machines—
which were largely developed for the purpose of isolat-
ing users in time-sharing systems on mainframes—but
he recognized potential for virtual machines to serve “the
future’s network of personal computers”.2
5 Early capabilities
The origin of containers is often attributed [54; 112; 119;
164; 31] to the addition of the chroot system call in the
Seventh Edition of UNIX released by Bell Labs in 1979
[106]. The simple form of filesystem namespace isola-
tion that chroot provides was certainly one influence
on the development of containers, though it lacked any
concept of isolation for process namespaces [103; 163].
However, containers are not a single technology, they are
a collection of technologies combined to provide secure
isolation, including namespaces, cgroups, seccomp, and
2It was a reasonable prediction for the time: HTTP was introducted
much later in the 1980s, but the RFC for the Internet Protocol (IP)
[161] was published in the same month as Creasy’s article, and TCP
had already been around since the mid-1970s.
capabilities. Combe et al. [54], Jian and Chen [100],
Kova´cs [112], Priedhorsky and Randles [163], and Raho
et al. [164] describe how these different technologies
combine to provide secure isolation for containers. It is
more accurate to attribute the origin of containers to the
earliest of these technologies, capabilities, which began
decades before chroot and several years before the first
work on virtual machines. Like containers, capabilities
took the approach of building secure isolation into the
hardware and the operating system, without virtualiza-
tion.
5.1 Descriptors
In the early 1960s, inspired by the need to isolate pro-
cesses, the Burroughs B5000 hardware architecture in-
troduced an improvement to memory protection called
descriptors, which flagged whether a particular memory
segment held code or data, and protected the system by
ensuring it could only execute code (and not data), and
could only access data appropriately (a single element
scalar, or bounds-checked array) [134; 118]. A process
on the B5000 could only access its own code and data
segments through a private Program Reference Table,
which held the descriptors for the process [118, p. 23].
A descriptor also flagged whether a segment was actively
in main memory or needed to be loaded from drum [118,
p. 24].
5.2 Dennis and Van Horn
In the mid-1960s, Dennis and Van Horn [64] introduced
the term capability in theoretical work directly inspired
by both the Burroughs B5000 and MIT’s Compatible
Time-Sharing System (CTSS) [64, p. 154]. Like the
B5000 descriptors, capabilities defined the set of mem-
ory segments a process was permitted to read, write,
or execute [118, p. 42]. These early capabilities intro-
duced several important refinements: a process executed
within a protected domain with an associated capability
list; multiple processes could share the same capability
list; and a process could FORK a parallel process with the
same capabilities (but no greater), or create a subprocess
with a subset of its own capabilities (but no greater) [118,
pp. 42-44]. These theoretical capabilities also had a con-
cept of ownership (by a process or a user) [118, p. 42],
and of persistent data “directories” (but not files) which
survived beyond the execution of a process and could be
private to a user or accessible to any user [118, pp. 44-
45].
Soon after Dennis and Van Horn published their theo-
retical capabilities, Ackerman and Plummer [14] imple-
mented some aspects of capabilities relating to resource
control on a modified PDP-1 at MIT, and added a file
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capability in addition to the directory capability—a pre-
cursor to filesystem namespaces.
5.3 Chicago Magic Number Machine
In 1967, the University of Chicago launched the first at-
tempt at designing and building a general-purpose hard-
ware and software capability system, which they later
called the Chicago Magic Number Machine3 [72; 73].
The Chicago machine pushed the concept of separation
between capabilities and data further, to protect against
users altering the capabilities that limited their access to
memory on the system [118, pp. 49-50]. The machine
had a set of physical registers for capabilities, which
were distinct from the usual set of registers for data. It
also flagged whether each memory segment stored capa-
bilities or data, and prevented processes from perform-
ing data operations like reading or writing on capability
segments or capability registers. Inter-process commu-
nication also sent both a capability segment and a data
segment [118, p. 51].
The University of Chicago project ran out of fund-
ing and was never completed, but it inspired subsequent
work on CAL-TSS [118, p. 49].
5.4 CAL-TSS
In 1968, the University of California at Berkeley
launched the CAL-TSS project [118, pp. 52-57], which
aimed to produce a general-purpose capability-based op-
erating system, to run on a Control Data Corporation
6400 model (RISC architecture) mainframe machine,
without any special customization to the hardware. Like
previous implementations, CAL-TSS confined a process
to a domain, restricting access to hardware registers,
memory, executable code, system calls to the kernel, and
inter-process communication. The project introduced a
concept of unique and non-reusable identifiers for ob-
jects, to protect against reuse of dangling pointers to ac-
cess and modify memory that has been reallocated after
being freed.
The CAL-TSS project encountered difficulties imple-
menting the operating system as designed, and was ter-
minated in 1971. Levy [118, p. 57] identified the mem-
ory management features of the CDC 6400 as a partic-
ularly troublesome obstacle to the implementation. In
postmortem analysis, Sturgis [184] and Lampson and
Sturgis [114] reflected that CAL-TSS ended up being
large, overly complex, and slow, and attributed this pri-
marily to a poor match between the hardware they se-
lected and the design of mapped address spaces, and also
3The unusual name was emblematic of the decade, from Ken Ke-
sey’s “Magic Bus” to the Beatles’ “Magical Mystery Tour”. At the level
of physical memory, capabilities are effectively a “magic” number.
to their design choice of distributing privileged code for
manipulating global system data across individual pro-
cesses, rather than consolidating it in a privileged kernel.
5.5 Plessey System 250
In the early 1970s, the Plessey System 250 [71] was
a commercially successful real-time multiprocessing
telephone-switch controller. It implemented capabili-
ties for memory protection and process isolation [118,
p. 65], and expanded capabilities into the I/O system
[118, p. 77].
5.6 Provably Secure Operating System
Also in the early 1970s, the Stanford Research Institute
began a project to explore the potential of formal proofs
applied to a capability-based operating system design,
which they called the Provably Secure Operating Sys-
tem (PSOS) [148]. The design was completed in 1980,
but never fully formally proven, and never implemented
[149].
5.7 CAP
In the late 1970s, the University of Cambridge’s CAP
machine [146; 207] successfully implemented capabili-
ties as general-purpose hardware combined with a com-
plementary operating system. The CAP introduced a re-
finement replacing the privileged kernel with an ordinary
process, so the special control the “root” process had
over the entire system was really just the normal ability
of any process to create subprocesses and grant a subset
of its own capabilities to those subprocesses [118, pp. 80-
81].
5.8 Object systems
Several software offshoots of the early capability systems
generalized the idea by treating processes and shared re-
sources as typed objects with associated capabilities, in-
cluding Carnegie-Mellon’s Hydra [214; 215] and StarOS
[101].
5.9 IBM System/38
In 1978, IBM announced plans for a capability-
based hardware architecture, the System/38, which they
shipped in 1980 [118, p. 137]. Berstis [32] characterized
the primary goal of the System/38 as improving mem-
ory protection without sacrificing performance. Houdek
[94] described the implementation of capabilities as pro-
tected pointers in detail. The System/38 introduced a
concept of user profiles associated with protected process
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domains [32, pp. 249-250], which were vaguely reminis-
cent of modern user namespaces, though implemented
differently. User profiles allowed for revocation of ca-
pabilities, but at the cost of significantly increased com-
plexity in the implementation [118, pp. 155-156].
The System/38 was succeeded by the AS/400 in the
late 1980s, which removed capability-based addressing
[181, p. 119]. The AS/400 later adopted the concept
of logical partitioning from the IBM System/370 [174,
pp. 1-2], to divide the physical resources of the host
machine between multiple guests at the hardware level4
[181, pp. 240, 328].
5.10 Intel iAPX 432
In 1975, Intel began designing the iAPX 432 [2]
capability-based hardware architecture, which they orig-
inally intended to be their next-generation, market-
leading CPU, replacing the 8080 [135, p. 79]. The
project finally shipped in 1981, but it was significantly
delayed and significantly over budget [135, p. 79].
Mazor [135, p. 75] recorded that performance was not
considered as a goal in the design of the iAPX 432.
Hansen et al. [90] measured the performance of the
iAPX 432 against the Intel 8086, Motorola 68000, and
the VAX-11/780 in 1982, with results as poor as 95 times
slower on some benchmarks. Norton [150, p. 27] as-
sessed the poor performance and unoptimized compiler
offered by the iAPX 432 as the leading cause of its com-
mercial failure. Levy [118, p. 186] blamed the commer-
cial failure on both poor performance and over-hyped
marketing.
In a move that Mazor described as “a crash pro-
gram...to save Intel’s market share” [135, p. 75], Intel
launched a parallel project to develop the 8086 architec-
ture (the first in a long line of x86 CPUs), which became
Intel’s leading product line by default, rather than by de-
sign [135, p. 79].5
5.11 Trade-offs
The early capability systems in the 1960s and 1970s sac-
rificed performance for the sake of security, though Levy
speculated in the mid-1980s that this was partly due to
“hardware poorly matched to the task” [118, p. 205].
Wilkes [206, pp. 49-59] contrasted the memory protec-
tion features of capabilities with other systems of the
time, including detailed descriptions of hardware imple-
mentations.
4Unlike virtual machines, capabilities, or containers, which divide
physical resources at the software level.
5In hindsight, the commercial failure of the iAPX 432 probably in-
fluenced Intel’s single-minded focus on performance and disinterest in
memory protection techniques in the decades that followed, which ul-
timately contributed to the vulnerabilities discussed in Section 8.
Levy [118, p. 205] also observed that the early capa-
bility systems significantly increased complexity for the
sake of security. Patterson and Se´quin [155] and Patter-
son and Ditzel [154] judged this sacrifice as a major rea-
son the capability machines were surpassed by simpler
architectures, such as RISC.
Kirk McKusick recalled that the primary reason Bill
Joy ported chroot from UNIX into BSD in 1982 was
for portability, so he could build different versions of the
system in an isolated build directory [103, p. 11].
5.12 Decline
As with virtual machines, interest in the early capabil-
ity systems sharply declined in the 1980s, influenced by
several independent factors. Several early attempts to
implement capabilities were terminated uncompleted—
notably the Chicago Magic Number Machine, CAL-
TSS, and the Provably Secure Operating System—
contributing to a reputation that capability systems were
difficult to implement and perhaps overly ambitious, de-
spite the successful implementations that followed. The
commercial failure of Intel’s iAPX 432 raised further
doubts on the feasibility of capability-based architec-
tures. In 2003, Neumann and Feiertag [149, p. 6] looked
back on the early capability systems, expressing disap-
pointment that “the demand for meaningfully secure sys-
tems has remained surprisingly small until recently”.
Perhaps the most significant factor in the decline of
capabilities was the rise of the general-purpose oper-
ating system, which was a third important technology
that evolved from multiprogramming. MIT’s Compatible
Time-Sharing System (CTSS) [55; 206] laid the founda-
tion for Multics [56], which later inspired UNIX [166]
and its robust mutation, the Berkeley Software Distri-
bution (BSD)6 [136; 137]. Saltzer and Schroeder [172,
p. 1294] contrasted capabilities with the access control
list models adopted by Multics and its descendants, call-
ing out revocation of access as one major area where ca-
pabilities fell short.
While none of the early capability systems remain
in use today, they have not been entirely forgotten. In
2003, Miller et al. [141] reviewed capability systems
from a historical perspective, addressing common mis-
conceptions about capabilities related to revocation, con-
finement, and equivalence to access control lists. Sec-
tion 7 traces the evolution of a feature called capabil-
ities in the modern Linux Kernel. FreeBSD took a
different approach for the feature it calls capabilities,
6One noteworthy connection between these factors is Robert Fabry,
who worked on the Chicago Magic Number Machine in the 1960s [72;
73] while doing a PhD at the University of Chicago [74], and was also
the catalyst for Berkeley’s interest in UNIX and substantial investment
in the BSD project, while he was a professor at Berkeley in the 1970s
[136].
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and integrated the Capsicum framework [138, p. 30],
which was more directly derived from the classic capa-
bility systems [196; 21]. In 2012, the CHERI project
[197; 199; 212; 200] expanded on the ideas of the Cap-
sicum framework, pushing its capability model down
into a RISC-based hardware architecture. Since 2016,
Google has been exploring a revival of capability sys-
tems with the Fuchsia operating system and Zircon mi-
crokernel [86]. In a 2018 plenary session about Spec-
tre/Meltdown, Hennessy [92] pointed to future potential
for capabilities, reflecting that the early capability sys-
tems “probably weren’t the right match for what software
designers thought they needed and they were too ineffi-
cient at the time”, but suggested “those are all things we
know how to fix now...so it’s time, I think, to begin re-
examining some of those more sophisticated [protection]
mechanisms and see if they’ll work”.
6 Modern virtual machines
Virtual machines still existed in the 1980s and 1990s, but
garnered only a bare minimum of activity and interest.
DOS, OS/2, and Windows all offered a limited form of
DOS virtual machines during that time, though it might
be more fair to categorize those as emulation. The rise
of programming languages like Smalltalk and Java re-
purposing the term “virtual machine”—to refer to an ab-
straction layer of a language runtime, rather than a soft-
ware replication of a real hardware architecture—may be
indicative of how dead the original concept of virtual ma-
chines was in that period.
After a hiatus lasting nearly two decades, the late
1990s brought a resurgence of interest in virtual ma-
chines, but for a new purpose adapted to the technology
of the time.
6.1 Disco
In 1997, the Disco research project at Stanford Uni-
versity explored reviving virtual machines as an ap-
proach to making efficient use of hardware with multi-
ple CPUs (on the order of “tens to hundreds”), and in-
cluded a lightweight library operating system for guests
(SPLASHOS) as an option, in addition to supporting
commodity operating systems as guests. Bugnion et
al. [39] cited portability (rather than security or perfor-
mance) as the primary motivation of the Disco project,
which proposed virtual machines as a potential way to al-
low commodity operating systems (Unix, Windows NT,
and Linux) to run on NUMA architectures without ex-
tensive modifications.
6.2 VMware
A year later, the team behind Disco founded VMware
to continue their work, and released a workstation prod-
uct in 1999 [40], quickly followed by two server prod-
ucts (GSX and ESX) in 2001 [194; 18; 173]. VMware
faced a challenge in virtualizing the x86 architectures
of the time, because the hardware did not support tra-
ditional virtualization techniques—specifically the archi-
tecture contained some sensitive instructions which were
not also privileged—so a virtual machine monitor could
not rely on trapping protection exceptions as the sole
means of identifying when to execute emulated instruc-
tions as a safe replacement, since some potentially harm-
ful instructions would never be trapped [168, p.131].7 To
work around this limitation, VMware combined the trap-
and-execute technique with a dynamic binary translation
technique [40, p.12:3], which was faster than full emula-
tion, but still allowed the guest operating system to run
unmodified [40, p.12:29-36].
6.3 Denali
The Denali project at the University of Washington in
2002 [204] introduced the term “paravirtualization”,8 an-
other work-around for the lack of hardware virtualiza-
tion support in x86, which involved altering the instruc-
tion set in the virtualized hardware architecture, and then
porting the guest operating system to run on the altered
instruction set [203].
6.4 Xen
The Xen project at the University of Cambridge in 2003
[26] also used paravirtualization techniques and mod-
ified guest operating systems, but emphasized the im-
portance of preserving the application binary interface
(ABI) within the guests so that guest applications could
run unmodified. Xen’s greatest technical contribution
may have been its approach to precise accounting for
resource usage, with the explicit intention to individu-
ally bill tenants sharing physical machines [26, p.176],
which was a relatively radical idea at the time,9 and di-
rectly led to the creation of Amazon’s Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2) a couple of years later [28].10
Chisnall [47] provided a detailed account of Xen’s
architecture and design goals. Xen’s approach to the
7Popek and Goldberg [160] classically defined such machines as
unvirtualizable.
8The term was new, but the technique had roots stretching back to
IBM’s VM/370 [60; 84].
9Partially inspired by earlier work, involving some of the same au-
thors, on resource management in the Nemesis operating system [27].
10The EC2 beta was launched in 2006, but when I presented at the
Amazon Developers Conference in 2005, they were already working
on it.
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problem of untrapped x86 privileged instructions was
to substitute a set of hypercalls for unsafe system calls
[47, pp.10-13]. Smith and Nair [179, p.422] highlighted
that Xen was able to run unmodified application binaries
within the guest, because it ran the guest in ring 1 of the
IA-32 privilege levels and the hypervisor in ring 0, so all
privileged instructions were filtered through the hypervi-
sor.
6.5 x86 Hardware virtualization exten-
sions
In 2000, Robin and Irvine [168] analyzed the limita-
tions of the x86 architecture as a host for virtual ma-
chine implementations, with reference to Goldberg’s ear-
lier work [82] on the architectural features required to
support virtual machines. In the mid-2000s, in response
to the growing success of virtual machines, and the chal-
lenges of implementing them on x86 hardware, Intel and
AMD both added hardware support for virtualization in
the form of a less privileged execution mode to execute
code for the virtual machine guest directly, but selec-
tively trap sensitive instructions, eliminating the need
for binary translation or paravirtualization. Rosenblum
and Garfinkel [170] discussed the motivations behind the
added hardware support for virtualization in x86, before
the changes were released. Pearce et al. [156, p. 7]
contrasted binary translation, paravirtualization, and the
features x86 added for hardware-assisted virtualization,
clarifying the x86 virtualization extensions were not full
virtualization. Adams and Agesen [16] recounted the dif-
ficulties VMware encountered while integrating the x86
hardware virtualization extensions, and concluded that
the new features offered no performance advantage over
binary translation.
In 2007, the KVM subsystem for the Linux Kernel
provided an API for accessing the x86 hardware virtual-
ization extensions [108]. Since KVM was only a Kernel
subsystem, the developers released a fork of QEMU11
as the userspace counterpart of KVM, so the combina-
tion of QEMU+KVM provided a full virtual machine
implementation, including virtual devices [195, pp.128-
129]. Eventually, KVM support was merged into main-
line QEMU [120].
6.6 Hyper-V
In 2008, Microsoft released a beta of Hyper-V [105] for
Windows Server. It was built on top of the x86 hardware
virtualization extensions, and for some virtual devices
offered a choice between slower emulation and faster
paravirtualization if the guest operating system installed
11Which was previously only an emulator [29].
the “Enlightened I/O” extensions. Like Xen’s Dom0,
Hyper-V granted special privileges to one guest, called
the “parent partition”, which hosted the virtual devices
and handled requests from the other guests.
In 2010, Bolte et al. [35] incorporated support
for Hyper-V into libvirt, so it could be managed
through a standardized interface, together with Xen,
QEMU+KVM, and VMware ESX.
6.7 Trade-offs
Denali and Xen both used paravirtualization techniques,
sacrificing portability to gain performance, but their
goals for scale were completely different: Denali con-
sidered 10,000 virtual machines12 to be a good result
[205]—achieved through a combination of lightweight
guests and a minimal host—while Xen argued that 100
virtual machines running full operating systems13 was a
more reasonable target [26, p.165,175]. To some extent,
Denali was more in line with modern container imple-
mentations than with the virtual machine implementa-
tions of its day. Xen has shifted their estimation of re-
quired scale upward over the years, but still exhibits a
tolerance for unnecessarily mediocre performance. For
example, Manco et al. [129] demonstrated that a few
small internal changes to the way Xen stores metadata
and creates virtual devices improved virtual machine in-
stantiation time by an order of magnitude—a result 50-
200 times faster than Docker’s container instantiation—
however those patches are unlikely to ever make it into
mainline Xen.
Xen and KVM have a reputation for sacrificing per-
formance to gain security, however several independent
lines of research have raised questions as to whether
those security gains are real or imagined. Perez-Botero
et al. [157] analyzed security vulnerabilities in Xen and
KVM between 2008-2012, categorizing them by source,
vector, and target, and observed that the most common
vector of attack was device emulation (Xen 34%, KVM
40%), the majority were triggered from within the virtual
machine guest (Xen 71%, KVM 66%), and the majority
successfully targeted the hypervisor’s Ring -1 privileges
or slightly less privileged control over Dom0 or the host
operating system (Xen 80%, KVM 76%). Chandramouli
et al. [46] built on the work of Perez-Botero et al. [157],
moving toward a more general framework for forensic
analysis of vulnerabilities in virtual machine implemen-
tations. Ishiguro and Kono [99] evaluated vulnerabili-
ties in Xen and KVM related to instruction emulation
between 2009-2017. They demonstrated that a prototype
“instruction firewall” on KVM—which denies emulation
12On a 1.7GHz Pentium 4 with 1GB RAM.
13On a 2.4GHz dual-core Xeon with 2GB RAM.
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of all instructions except the small subset deemed legit-
imate in the current execution context—could have de-
fended against the known instruction emulation vulnera-
bilities, however the patches are unlikely to ever make it
into mainline KVM.
Szefer et al. [189] demonstrated in the NoHype imple-
mentation (based on Xen) that eliminating the hypervisor
and running virtual machines with more direct access to
the hardware improved security by reducing the attack
surface and removing virtual machine exit events as po-
tential attack vectors. However, the approach involved a
performance trade-off in resource utilization that was not
viable for most real deployments: it pre-allocated proces-
sor cores, memory, and I/O devices dedicated to specific
virtual machines, rather than allowing for oversubscrip-
tion and dynamic allocation in response to load.
One persistent argument in favor of virtual machines
has been that virtual machine implementations have
fewer lines of code than a kernel or host operating sys-
tem, and are therefore easier to code-review and secure
[39; 79; 129; 156; 176], which is the classic trade-off of
minimizing complexity to gain security. However, less
code offers only a vague potential for security, and even
that potential becomes questionable as modern virtual
machine implementations have grown larger and more
complex [53; 156; 211; 37].
Recent work on virtual machines—such as ukvm
[209], LightVM [129], and Kata Containers (formerly
Intel Clear Containers) [5]—has shifted back toward an
emphasis on improving performance. However, this
work appears to be founded on the assumption that the
virtual machine implementations under discussion are
adequately secure, and need only improve performance,
which is a dubious assumption at best.
Two notable departures from this complacent atti-
tude to security are Google’s crosvm [85] and Amazon’s
Firecracker [19], which aim to improve both perfor-
mance and security, by replacing QEMU with a radically
smaller and simpler userspace component for KVM, and
by choosing Rust as the implementation language for
memory safety.14 Firecracker started as a fork of crosvm,
but the two projects are collaborating on generalizing the
divergence into a set of Rust libraries they can share.
6.8 Decline
Toward the end of the 2000s, the enthusiasm for virtual
machines gave way to a growing skepticism. Garfinkel et
al. [80] demonstrated that virtual machine environments
14The memory safety features of Rust do not address the secu-
rity vulnerabilities discussed in Section 8, but can eliminate another
common class of memory access vulnerabilities, such as buffer over-
flows/underflows and use-after-free. Szekeres et al. [190] provide
a systematic account of such vulnerabilities and their impact in the
C/C++ programming languages.
could reliably be detected on close inspection, reviving
the long-running tension between the ideals of strong iso-
lation in virtual machines, and the reality of actual imple-
mentations. Buzen and Gagliardi [43] commented on the
ideals in the early 1970s, “Since a privileged software nu-
cleus has, in principle, no way of determining whether it
is running on a virtual or a real machine, it has no way of
spying on or altering any other virtual machine that may
be coexisting with it in the same system.” but in the same
paper acknowledged, “In practice no virtual machine is
completely equivalent to its real machine counterpart.”
In 2010, Bratus et al. [37] criticized the myopic focus
of systems security research on virtual machines and the
resulting neglect of other potentially superior approaches
to system security. Vasudevan et al. [192] outlined a
set of requirements for protecting the integrity of virtual
machines implemented on x86 with hardware virtualiza-
tion support, and evaluated all existing implementations
as “unsuitable for use with highly sensitive applications”
[192, p.141]. Colp et al. [53] observed that multitenant
environments presented new risks for virtual machine
implementations, because they required stronger isola-
tion between guests sharing the same host than was nec-
essary when a single tenant owned the entire physical
machine.
Virtual machines such as Xen, QEMU+KVM, Hyper-
V, and VMware are still in active use today, but in recent
years they have entirely ceded their reputation as the “hot
new thing” to containers.
7 Modern containers
The collection of technologies that make up modern con-
tainer implementations started coming together years be-
fore anyone used the term “container”. The two decade
span surrounding the development of containers corre-
sponded to a major shift in the way information about
technological advances was broadcast and consumed.
Exploring the socio-economic factors driving this shift is
outside the scope of this survey, however, it is worth not-
ing that the academic literature on more recent projects
such as Docker and Kubernetes is largely written by out-
siders providing external commentary, rather than by the
primary developers of the technologies. As a result, re-
cent academic publications on containers tend to lack the
depth of perspective and insight that was common to ear-
lier publications on virtual machines, capabilities, and
security in the Linux Kernel. The dialog driving inno-
vation and improvements to the technology has not dis-
appeared, but it has moved away from the academic lit-
erature and into other communication channels.
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7.1 POSIX capabilities
In the mid-1990s, the security working group of the
POSIX standards project began drafting an extension to
the POSIX.1 standard, called POSIX 1003.1e [3; 70; 89],
which added a feature called “capabilities”. The im-
plementation details of POSIX capabilities were entirely
different than the early capability systems [198, p.97],
but had similarities on a conceptual level: POSIX ca-
pabilities were a set of flags associated with a process
or file, which determined whether a process was per-
mitted to perform certain actions; a process could exec
a subprocess with a subset of its own capabilities; and
the specification attempted to support the principle of
least privilege [3]. However, the POSIX capabilities did
not adopt the concepts of small access domains and no-
privilege defaults, which were crucial elements of se-
cure isolation in the early capability systems [61]. The
POSIX.1e draft was withdrawn from the process in 1998
and never formally adopted as a standard [89, p.259], but
it formed the basis of the capabilities feature added to the
Linux Kernel in 1999 (release 2.2) [4; 130].
7.2 Namespaces and resource controls
A second important strand in the evolution of mod-
ern container implementations was the isolation of pro-
cesses via namespaces and resource usage controls. In
2000, FreeBSD added Jails [103], which isolated filesys-
tem namespaces (using chroot), but also isolated pro-
cesses and network resources, in such a way that a pro-
cess might be granted root privileges inside the jail,
but blocked from performing operations that would af-
fect anything outside the jail. In 2001, Linux VServer
[180] patched the Linux Kernel to add resource usage
limits and isolation for filesystems, network addresses,
and memory. Around the same time, Virtuozzo (later
released as OpenVZ) [96; 133] also patched the Linux
Kernel to add resource usage limits and isolation for
filesystems, processes, users, devices, and interprocess
communication (IPC). In 2003, Nagar et al. [144] pro-
posed a framework for resource usage control and me-
tering called Class-based Kernel Resource Management
(CKRM), and later released it as a set of patches to the
Linux Kernel.
In 2002, the Linux Kernel (release 2.4.19) introduced
a filesystem namespaces feature [107].15 In 2006, Bie-
derman [33] proposed expanding the idea of namespace
isolation in the Linux Kernel beyond the filesystem to
process IDs, IPC, the network stack, and user IDs. The
Kernel developers accepted the idea, and the patches to
implement the features landed in the Kernel between
15Partially inspired by the namespaces feature of Plan 9 [158] from
Bell Labs.
2006 and 2013 (releases 2.6.19 to 3.8) [107]. The last set
of patches to be completed was user namespaces, which
allow an unprivileged user to create a namespace and
grant a process full privileges for operations inside that
namespace, while granting it no privileges for operations
outside that namespace [11]. The way user namespaces
are nested bears a resemblance to Dennis and Van Horn’s
[64] capabilities, where processes created more restricted
subprocesses.
In 2004, Solaris added Zones [162] (sometimes also
called Solaris Containers), which isolated processes into
groups that could only observe or signal other processes
in the same group, associated each zone with an isolated
filesystem namespace, and set limits for shared resource
consumption (initially only CPU). Between 2006 and
2007, Rohit Seth and Paul Menage worked on a patch
for the Linux Kernel for a feature they called “process
containers” [57]—later renamed to cgroups for “control
groups”—which provided resource limiting, prioritiza-
tion, accounting,16 and control features for processes.
7.3 Access control and system call filtering
A third set of relevant features in the Linux Kernel
evolved around secure isolation of processes through re-
stricted access to system calls. In 2000, Cowan et al.
[59] released SubDomain, a Linux Kernel module which
added access control checks to a limited set of system
calls related to executing processes. In 2001, Loscocco
and Smalley [124] published an architectural description
of SELinux, which implemented mandatory access con-
trol (MAC) for the Linux Kernel. The access control ar-
chitecture of SELinux was received positively, but the
implementation was rejected for being too tightly cou-
pled with the kernel. So, in 2002, Wright et al. [213]
proposed the Linux Security Modules (LSM) framework
as a more general approach to extensible security in the
Linux Kernel, which made it possible for security poli-
cies to be loaded as Kernel modules. LSM is not an ac-
cess control mechanism, but it provides a set of hooks
where other security extensions such as SELinux or Ap-
pArmor can insert access control checks. LSM and a
modified version of SELinux based on LSM were both
merged into the mainline Linux Kernel in 2003. In 2004-
2005, SubDomain was rewritten to use LSM, and re-
branded under the name AppArmor.
In 2005, Andrea Arcangeli [22] released a set of
patches to the Linux Kernel called seccomp for “secure
computing”, which restricted a process so that it could
only run an extremely limited set of system calls to
exit/return or interact with already open filehandles, and
terminated a process attempting to run any other system
16Similar in idea, though not in implementation, to Xen’s resource
usage accounting.
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calls. The patches were merged into the mainline Ker-
nel later that year. However, the features of the original
seccomp were inadequate and rarely used, and over the
years multiple proposals to improve seccomp were un-
successful. Then, in 2012, Will Drewry [67] extended
seccomp to allow filters for system calls to be dynami-
cally defined using Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) rules,
which provided enough flexibility to make seccomp use-
ful as an isolation technique. In 2013, Krude and Meyer
[113] implemented a framework for isolating untrusted
workloads on multitenant infrastructures using seccomp
system call filter policies written in BPF.
7.4 Cluster management
A fourth relevant strand of technology evolved around
resource sharing in large-scale cluster management. In
2001, Lottiaux and Morin [125] used the term “con-
tainer” for a form of shared, distributed memory which
provided the illusion that multiple nodes in an SMP clus-
ter were sharing kernel resources, including memory,
disk, and network. In 2002, the Zap project [152] used
the term “pod”17 for a group of processes sharing a pri-
vate namespace, which had an isolated view of system
resources such as process identifiers and network ad-
dresses. These pods were self-contained, so they could
be migrated as a unit between physical machines. In the
mid-2000s, Google deployed a cluster management solu-
tion called Borg [193; 42] into production, to orchestrate
the deployment of their vast suite of web applications
and services. While the code for Borg has never been
seen outside Google, it was the direct inspiration for the
Kubernetes project a decade later [193, p.18:13-14]—the
Borg alloc became the Kubernetes pod, Borglets became
Kubelets, and tasks gave way to containers. Burns et al.
[42, p.70] explained that improving performance through
resource utilization was one of the primary motivations
for Borg.
7.5 Combined features
The strength of modern containers is not in any one fea-
ture, but in the combination of multiple features for re-
source control and isolation. In 2008, Linux Contain-
ers (LXC) [6] combined cgroups, namespaces, and ca-
pabilities from the Linux Kernel into a tool for build-
ing and launching low-level system containers. Miller
and Chen [140] demonstrated that filesystem isolation
between LXC containers could be improved by apply-
ing SELinux policies. Xavier et al. [216] and Raho et
al. [164] contrasted LXC’s approach to isolation and
resource control using standard Linux Kernel features
17Given as an acronym for a PrOcess Domain abstraction.
such as cgroups and filesystem, process, IPC, and net-
work namespaces, versus the approaches taken by Linux
VServer and OpenVZ using custom patches to the Linux
Kernel to provide similar features.
Docker [139] launched in 2013 as a container man-
agement platform built on LXC. In 2014, Docker re-
placed LXC with libcontainer, its own implemen-
tation for creating containers, which also used Linux
Kernel namespaces, cgroups, and capabilities [97; 164].
Morabito et al. [142] compared the performance of
LXC and Docker after the transition to libcontainer, and
found them to be roughly equivalent on CPU perfor-
mance, disk I/O, and network I/O, however LXC per-
formed 30% better on random writes, which may have
been related to Docker’s use of a union file system. Raho
et al. [164] contrasted the implementations of Docker,
QEMU+KVM, and Xen on the ARM hardware architec-
ture. Mattetti et al. [132] experimented with dynamically
generating AppArmor rules for Docker containers based
on the application workload they contained. Catuogno
and Galdi [45] performed a case study of Docker using
two different models for security assessment. They built
on the work of Reshetova et al. [165] in classifying vul-
nerabilities by the goal of the attack: denial of service,
container compromise, or privilege escalation.
In 2015, Docker split the container runtime out into
a separate project, runc, in support of a vendor-neutral
container runtime specification maintained by the Open
Container Initiative (OCI). Hykes [98] highlighted that
SELinux, AppArmor, and seccomp were all standard
supported features in runc. Koller and Williams [111]
observed that runc was more minimal than the Docker
runtime, while still using the same isolation mechanisms
from the Linux Kernel, such as namespaces and cgroups.
In 2016, Docker and CoreOS merged their container im-
age formats into a vendor-neutral container image format
specification, also at OCI [36].
7.6 Orchestration
In 2014, Docker began working on Swarm, described as
a clustering system for Docker, which they ultimately
released late in 2015 [126]. Also in 2014, Google be-
gan developing Kubernetes, an orchestration tool for de-
ploying and managing the lifecycle of containers, which
they released in the middle of 2015 [38]. Also in 2014,
Canonical began developing LXD, a container orches-
tration tool for LXC containers, which they released in
2016 [88].
Verma et al. [193] outlined the design goals behind
Kubernetes, in the context of lessons learned from Borg.
Syed and Fernandez [187; 188] pointed out that the per-
formance advantages of the higher-level container or-
chestration tools, such as Kubernetes and Docker Swarm,
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were primarily a matter of improving resource utiliza-
tion. They also contrasted the portability advantages of
managing containers across multiple physical host ma-
chines against the increased complexity required for the
orchestration tools to advance beyond managing a sin-
gle machine host. Souppaya et al. [182] systematically
reviewed increased security risks and mitigation tech-
niques for container orchestration tools. Bila et al. [34]
extended Kubernetes with a vulnerability scanning ser-
vice and network quarantine for containers.
7.7 Trade-offs
Containers have a reputation for substantially better per-
formance than virtual machines, however that reputation
may not be deserved. In 2015, Felter et al. [75] mea-
sured the performance of Docker against QEMU+KVM
and determined that neither had significant overhead on
CPU and memory usage, but that KVM had a 40% higher
overhead in I/O. They observed that the overhead was
primarily due to extra cycles on each I/O operation, so
the impact could be mitigated for some applications by
batching multiple small I/O operations into fewer large
I/O operations. In 2017, Kova´cs [112] compared CPU
execution time and network throughput between Docker,
LXC, Singularity, KVM, and bare metal and determined
that there was no significant variation between them, as
long as Docker and LXC were running in host network-
ing mode, but in Linux bridge mode Docker and LXC
exhibited high retransmission rates that negatively im-
pacted their throughput compared to the others. Manco
et al. [129] demonstrated that Xen virtual machine in-
stantiation could be 50-200 times faster than Docker con-
tainer instantiation, with a few low-level modifications to
Xen’s control stack.
Secure isolation technologies have been the core of
modern container implementations from the beginning,
so it would be reasonable to expect that containers would
provide a strong form of isolation. However, early imple-
mentations of containers were prone to preventable se-
curity vulnerabilities, which may indicate that security
was not a primary design consideration, at least not ini-
tially. Combe et al. [54] analyzed security vulnerabilities
in Docker and libcontainer between 2014-2015, and
determined that the majority were related to filesystem
isolation, which led to privilege escalation when Docker
was run as the root user. They also suggested that some
of Docker’s sane default configurations for the isolation
features of the Linux Kernel could be easily switched to
less secure configurations through standard options to the
docker command-line tool or the Docker daemon, and
so might be prone to user error. Martin et al. [131] sur-
veyed vulnerabilities in Docker images, libcontainer,
the Docker daemon, and orchestration tools, as well as
the unique security challenges of containers in multi-
tenant infrastructures. In addition to security patches
for specific privilege escalation vulnerabilities, there has
been ongoing work to integrate support for user names-
paces into Docker and Kubernetes,18 so they can run as
a non-root user and limit the scope of damage from priv-
ilege escalation. However, the user namespaces feature
itself has had a series of vulnerabilities19 related to inter-
faces in the Kernel that were written with the expectation
of being restricted to the root user, but are now exposed
to unprivileged users.
One significant difference between virtual machine
implementations and container implementations is that
containers share a kernel with the host operating system,
so efforts to secure the kernel greatly impact the secu-
rity of containers. Reshetova et al. [165] considered the
set of secure isolation features offered by the Linux Ker-
nel as of 2014 (in the context of LXC), and judged them
to have caught up with the features of FreeBSD Jails
and Solaris Zones, but highlighted some areas for im-
provement in support of containers. These improvements
included integrating Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
into the Kernel as “security namespaces”; providing a
way to lock down device hotplug features for contain-
ers; and extending cgroups to support all resource man-
agement features supported by rlimits. Gao et al. [78]
discussed the risks of certain types of information that
containers can currently access from the Linux Kernel
via procfs and sysfs—which can be exploited to detect
co-resident containers and precisely target power con-
sumption spikes to overload servers—and prototyped a
power-based namespace to partition the information for
containers.
Some more recent approaches to secure isolation for
containers have been inspired by virtual machine imple-
mentations. Kata Containers (formerly Intel Clear Con-
tainers) [5] wraps each Docker container or Kubernetes
pod in a QEMU+KVM virtual machine [12]. They re-
alized that QEMU was not ideal for the purpose—since
it introduces a substantial performance hit compared to
running bare containers, and the majority of the code
relates to emulation which is not useful for wrapping
containers—so a group at Intel started working on a
stripped-down version of QEMU called NEMU [8]. X-
Containers [177] used Xen’s paravirtualization features
to improve isolation between containers and the host, but
made an unfortunate trade-off of removing isolation be-
tween containers running on the same host. Nabla Con-
tainers [7] and gVisor [87] have both taken an approach
of improving isolation by heavily filtering system calls
from containers to the host kernel, which is a common
18Such as Suda and Scrivano [186] and Suda [185].
19Such as CVE-2018-6559, CVE-2018-18955, CVE-2014-9717,
and CVE-2014-4014.
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technique for modern virtual machines.
Bratus et al. [37] noted that the “self-protection”
techniques employed by container implementations are
a necessary path for future research, since even virtual
machines depend on those techniques to protect them-
selves. Hosseinzadeh et al. [93] explored the possibil-
ity that container implementations might directly adapt
earlier work (primarily Berger et al. [30]) for virtual
machine implementations to integrate a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) as a virtual device.
Container implementations have a potential advantage
over virtual machine implementations in addressing the
problem of secure isolation over the long-term, not be-
cause any existing implementations are inherently su-
perior, but because containers take a modular approach
to implementation that permits them to be more flexible
over time and across different underlying software20 and
hardware architectures, as new ideas for secure isolation
evolve.
8 Security outlook
A series of vulnerabilities related to speculative execu-
tion and side-channel attacks rose to attention over the
past year. These vulnerabilities collectively upend tra-
ditional notions of secure isolation. The current reac-
tionary approach—patching up each vulnerability as it is
revealed—works in the short-term, but is a losing battle
in the long-term.21
Early in 2018, Kocher et al. [109] and Lipp et al. [122]
published a set of vulnerabilities, respectively called
Spectre and Meltdown, using techniques involving spec-
ulative execution and out-of-order execution. Spectre af-
fects Intel, AMD, and ARM [109, p.3], can be launched
from any user process (including JavaScript code run in a
browser) [109, p.3], and grants access to any memory an
attacked process could normally access [109, p.5]. Melt-
down affects Intel x86 architecture, can be launched from
any user process, and grants full access to any physical
memory on the same machine including kernel mem-
ory and memory allocated to any other process [122,
p.1]. In July 2018, Schwarz et al. [175] published a
remote variant of Spectre, nicknamed NetSpectre, which
is launched through packets over the network and grants
access to any physical memory accessible to the attacked
process. In August 2018, Van Bulck et al. [191] pub-
lished a variant of Meltdown, nicknamed Foreshadow
or more broadly “L1 Terminal Fault” (L1TF), which is
launched from unprivileged user space, and grants ac-
20Such as pledge and unveil on OpenBSD versus capabilities and
namespaces on Linux.
21Metaphorically reminiscent of the proverbial small Dutch child at-
tempting to protect the village from flooding by inserting a tiny finger
in each leak that springs in the floodbank wall.
cess to the L1 data cache, including encrypted data from
Intel’s Software Guard eXtensions (SGX). In Novem-
ber 2018, Canella et al. [44] reviewed the broad range
of speculative execution vulnerabilities and proposed a
comprehensive classification of the known variants and
mitigations, which also revealed several previously un-
known variants.
The models of secure isolation employed by virtual
machines and containers offer little protection from the
speculative execution vulnerabilities. Containers are vul-
nerable to Meltdown, though virtual machines are not be-
cause they run a different kernel than the host [122, p.12].
Both virtual machines and containers are vulnerable to
Spectre [10, p.3,5,6], NetSpectre [175, p.11], and L1TF
[202], with varying degrees of compromise. Variants of
L1TF22 are especially troublesome for virtual machines,
because they allow an unprivileged process in the user
space of a guest to access any memory on the physical
machine, including memory allocated to other guests, the
host operating system, and host kernel [13]. Multitenant
infrastructures generally allow any tenant to deploy a vir-
tual machine or container on any physical machine in the
cloud or cluster, which means it is viable to exploit these
vulnerabilities by simply creating an account with a pub-
lic provider and deploying malicious guests repeatedly,
until one of them lands on a physical host with interest-
ing secrets to steal.
The techniques behind the speculative execution vul-
nerabilities were not new, but the combined application
of the techniques was more sophisticated, and the se-
curity impact more severe, than previously considered
possible. Although these vulnerabilities were only re-
cently discovered and published by defensive security
researchers,23 it is possible that offensive security re-
searchers24 discovered and exploited them much earlier,
and continue to exploit additional unpublished variants.
While mitigation patches have typically been applied
quickly for the known variants of these vulnerabilities
[10; 9], it is not feasible to entirely disable speculative
execution [109, p.11] and out-of-order execution [122,
p.14], which are the primary vectors of the attacks, be-
cause the performance penalty is prohibitive, and in some
cases the hardware simply has no mechanism to disable
the features. The probability of further variants being
discovered in the coming years is high. A substantial re-
think of the fundamental hardware architecture could po-
tentially eliminate the entire class of vulnerabilities, but
in the research, development, and production timelines
common to hardware vendors such a significant change
could take decades.
Two notable alternative hardware architectures,
22Notably CVE-2018-3646.
23Also known as “white hat hackers”.
24Also known as “black hat hackers”.
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CHERI and RISC-V, were already under development
before the flood of speculative execution vulnerabilities
were published. CHERI [212] combines concepts from
classic capability systems and RISC architectures, with a
strong emphasis on memory protection. RISC-V [24] is
a RISC-based hardware architecture, aimed at providing
an extensible open source instruction set architecture
(ISA) used as an industry standard by a broad array of
hardware vendors. Neither CHERI nor RISC-V were
designed with speculative execution vulnerabilities in
mind, but Watson et al. [201] observed that CHERI
mitigates some aspects of Spectre and Meltdown but
is vulnerable to speculative memory access, while
Asanovic´ and O’Connor [23] announced that RISC-V is
not vulnerable because it does not perform speculative
memory access. In August 2018, Google announced
that the open source implementation of its Titan project,
providing a hardware root of trust, will likely be based
on RISC-V [167]. MIT’s Sanctum processor [58] was
also based on RISC-V and demonstrated potential for
secure hardware partitioning, by adding a small secure
CPU to the side of the main CPU. Hardware partitioning
might provide a way to mitigate the speculative execu-
tion vulnerabilities in multitenant environments, while
avoiding major changes to the kernel and operating sys-
tem. However, genuinely delivering the level of physical
isolation that x86 promised would likely require logical
partitioning of the main CPU, RAM, and cache of the
machine, so the guests and the host operating system
could share resources at the hardware level, but be far
more restricted at the software level than is currently
possible.
The problem of providing secure isolation for contain-
ers and virtual machines extends beyond simple refine-
ments to their implementations. When the fundamental
assumptions of a system are proven false, then any theo-
rems built on those assumptions may also be false. The
secure isolation features of the full stack—from the ker-
nel and operating system, through to virtual machines,
containers, and application workloads—are all built on
false assumptions about the behavior of the hardware,
and will need to be re-examined.
9 Related implementations
Implementation approaches that adopt the label “cloud”
[178; 95; 123; 66] are typically virtual machines with
added orchestration features to enhance portability.
Cloud implementations also tend to favor lighter-weight
guest images, which enhances performance and reduces
complexity, though cloud images are generally not quite
as minimal as container images.
Implementation approaches that adopt the label
“unikernel” [127; 115; 209] take minimalist guest im-
ages to an extreme, by replacing the kernel and operat-
ing system of the guest with a set of highly-optimized
libraries that provide the same functionality. The code
for an application workload is compiled together with the
small subset of unikernel libraries required by the appli-
cation, resulting in a very small binary that runs directly
as a guest image. Historically, unikernels have sacri-
ficed portability of guest images, by targeting only a lim-
ited set of virtual machine implementations as their host,
but recent work has begun exploring running unikernels
as containers [210]. The unikernel approach also re-
duces the portability of application code, since uniker-
nel frameworks tend to require the application code to be
written in the same language as the unikernel libraries.
Implementation approaches that adopt the label
“serverless” [104; 17; 111; 91] tend to emphasize porta-
bility and minimizing complexity. They rely on the
underlying infrastructure—typically some combination
of bare metal, virtual machines, and/or containers—for
whatever secure isolation and performance they provide.
10 Conclusion
A detailed examination of the history of virtual machines
and containers reveals that the two have evolved in tan-
dem from the very beginning. It also reveals that both
families of technology are facing significant challenges
in providing secure isolation for modern multitenant in-
frastructures. In light of recent vulnerabilities, patching
up existing tools is a necessary and valuable activity in
the short-term, but is not sufficient for the long-term. In
the coming decades, the computing industry as a whole
will need to embrace more radical alternatives in both
hardware and software. A deeper understanding of how
virtual machines and containers evolved—and the trade-
offs made along the way—can lead to new paths of ex-
ploration, and help the researchers and developers of to-
day make more informed choices for tomorrow.
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